UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-4-2010

State v. Ball Respondent's Brief Dckt. 35627

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Ball Respondent's Brief Dckt. 35627" (2010). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 244.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/244

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law.

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,
VS.

NO. 35627

1
1
1

JEFFERY A. BALL,

1

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
HONORABLE FRED M. GIBLER
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. VIIA-SDEN
Attorney General
State of ldaho
STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

HEATHER M. CARLSQN
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ldaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

L!

ATTORNEYS FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT
*

ATTORNEY FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

-

supmtna court -co'Jfi
Qf AJ'pna's-\
~nierad
QI!
ATS
by:
. ,
-U--JL
.' '

, ,

\ ;Lr

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings ........................ 1
ISSUES............................................................................................................ 3
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 4
I.

II.

Ball Has Failed To Show That The District Court
Failed To Comply With I.C.R. 11 ................................................ 4
A.

Introduction...................................................................... 4

B.

Standard Of Review......................................................... 4

C.

Ball Did Not Preserve This Issue For
Appellate Review With A Timely Objection
In The District Court ......................................................... 5

D.

Because The District Court Complied With
I.C.R. IIBy Allowing Bail The Opportunity
To Withdraw His Guilty Plea, Ball Has Failed
To Show Error.................................................................. 5

Ball Has Failed To Show That His Sentence Is Excessive ......... 9
A.

Introduction...................................................................... 9

B.

Standard Of Review.........................................................9

C.

Ball Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of
Sentencing Discretion......................................................9

CONCLUSION............................................................................................... 1
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................ 12

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

CASES

Schocler v. State. -Idaho

-.

226 P.3d 1269 (2010) ..................................... 6

State v. Dallas. 126 Idaho 273. 882 P.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1994)............................. 4
State v . Farwell. 144 Idaho 732. 170 P.3d 397 (2007) ................................... 9. 10
State v. Hedcler. 115 Idaho 598. 768 P.2d 1331 (1989) ................................... 6. 7
State v . Larios. 129 Idaho 631. 931 P.2d 625 (1997) ........................................... 4
State v . Martin. 119 Idaho 577. 808 P.2d 1322 (1991) ......................................... 5
State v . Mauro. 121 Idaho 178. 824 P.2d 109 (1991) .......................................... 5
State v . Oliver. 144 Idaho 722. 170 P.3d 387 (2007) ......................................... 10
State v. Smith. 130 Idaho 450. 942 P.2d 574 (Ct. App . 1997).............................. 5
Statev . Weber. 140 Idaho 89. 90 P.3d 314 (2004) .............................................. 4

RULES
I.C.R. 11 ...................................................................................................... passim

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeffrey Ball appeals from his conviction and sentence entered upon his
guilty plea to rape.
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedinqs
Ball recorded his son and the son's 16-year-old girlfriend in a sexually
compromised position. (61912008 PSE, p. 5; R., vol. I, pp. 23-27.) He used this
incident and other threats to blackmail and coerce the girlfriend into having sex
with him on multiple occasions. (61912008 PSE, p. 5; R., vol. I, pp. 23-27.) He
videotaped some of the rapes. (61912008 PSE, p. 5; R., vol. I, pp. 23-27.)
The state charged Ball with one count of rape. (R., vol. II, pp. 216-17.)
The state charged alternate theories of rape, both because of the victim's age
and because of force and violence. (Id.) Ball entered into a plea agreement.

(R., vol. 11, pp. 218-22.) The terms of the plea agreement included dismissal of a
firearms charge in another case (4114108 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 9-12); that the sentence
imposed by the court would be for ten years, leaving to the court's discretion how
much of that ten years to make determinate (4114108 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 13-18); that the
ten-year sentence would be binding on the court under I.C.R. Il(f)(l)(C) (4114108
Tr., p. 5, Ls. 13-15); that Ball would undergo a psychosexual evaluation and
polygraph examination (4114108 Tr., p. 5, Ls. 19-21); that Ball would not be
charged based on matters arising from the psychosexual examination and
polygraph (4114108 Tr., p. 5, L. 19 - p. 6, L. 3); and that the state would not file
additional charges arising from evidence found pursuant to the search warrant

associated with this case (4114108 Tr., p. 6, Ls. 3-14). After being apprised of the
terms of the agreement, the district court took Ball's guilty plea. (4114108 Tr., p.
10, L. 1 - p. 16, L. 25).
At sentencing the district court announced that, after review of the
sentencing materials, it would not be bound to the sentencing recommendation of
ten years and gave Ball the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea. (7/10/08 Tr.,
p. 20, Ls. 12-24.) After a recess, Ball agreed to go forward with the sentencing.
(7110108 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 1-20.) The judge ultimately imposed a sentence of 20
years with seven years fixed. (7110108 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 15-17; R., vol. II, pp. 26367.) Ball filed a notice of appeal timely from the entry of judgment. (R., vol. II,
pp. 271-72.)

ISSUES
Ball states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court abuse its discretion by refusing to be
bound by the Rule 11 plea agreement at sentencing, after it had the
benefit of the psychosexual and polygraph examinations?
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced
2.
Mr. Ball to twenty years, with seven fixed, following his guilty plea to
rape?
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
The district court concluded that its ultimate sentence was not going to be
within the range agreed to by the parties in the binding Rule 11 agreement. It
gave Ball the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea, but Ball elected not to
withdraw his plea. The district court therefore fully complied with its duties under
Rule 11. Has Ball failed to show that the district court erred?

Has Ball failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it
2.
sentenced him to 20 years with seven fixed for rape?

ARGUMENT
I.
Ball Has Failed To Show That The District Court Failed To Comply With I.C.R. 11
A.

Introduction
The district court informed Ball that it would not be following the parties'

sentencing recommendations and gave Ball the opportunity to withdraw his guilty
plea as required by I.C.R. 11(f)(4). (7/10/08 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 12-24.) Ball argues on
appeal that because he had submitted to the PSE and the polygraph the court
was required to sentence him in the range agreed to by the parties because
withdrawal of the plea was no longer a "sufficient remedy." (Appellant's brief, pp.
4-7, 10.) This argument fails for two reasons. First, it was not preserved by an
objection below. Second, it is clear on the record that the district court complied
with the requirements of Rule 11.
B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation of an ldaho Criminal Rule presents a question of law

over which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Weber, 140 ldaho
89, 91-92, 90 P.3d 314, 316-17 (2004) (citing State v. Larios, 129 ldaho 631,
633, 931 P.2d 625, 627 (1997); State v. Dallas, 126 ldaho 273, 274, 882 P.2d
440,441 (Ct. App. 1994)).

C.

Ball Did Not Preserve This Issue For Appellate Review With A Timely
Obiection In The District Court
It is well settled that issues not raised before the trial court will not be

considered for the first time on appeal. State v. Martin, 119 ldaho 577, 579, 808
P.2d 1322, 1324 (1991). See also State v. Mauro, 121 ldaho 178, 181, 824 P.2d
109, 112 (1991); State v. Smith, 130 ldaho 450,454,942 P.2d 574,578 (Ct. App.
1997).

Because Ball did not assert to the district court that it had lost all

discretion to reject the sentencing recommendations, and does not on appeal
claim fundamental error, he has failed to preserve this issue for appellate review.
D.

Because The District Court Comolied With I.C.R. II BVAllowinq Ball The
Op~ortunitvTo Withdraw His Guilty Plea. Ball Has Failed To Show Error
Rule 11 of the ldaho Criminal Rules sets forth the applicable plea

agreement procedures.

I . .. I f ) .

A plea agreement may include an

agreement for a specific sentence. I.C.R. Il(f)(l)(C). If the agreement is for a
specific sentence, tine court may defer its acceptance of the agreement until
"there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report."

I.A.R.

11(f)(2). If the court rejects the plea agreement, it must give the defendant the
opportunity to withdraw the plea. 1,C.R. II(f)(4).
The record shows that the district court followed the requirements of Rule
11. It specifically informed Ball at the time of the plea itself that it would inform
Ball at the time of sentencing if it accepted the plea agreement and give him the
opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea if it did not. (4114108 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 8-17.)
Ball stated that he understood this. (4114108 Tr., p. 13, L. 18.) The district court

also explained to Ball that if it accepted the plea at the time of sentencing Ball
would have no right to withdraw his plea. (4114108 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 19-23.)
At the time of sentencing the district court informed Ball that it was not
going to accept the parties' sentencing recommendation and gave him the
opportunity to withdraw his plea. (7/10/08 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 12-24.) Ball elected to
proceed with sentencing. (7/10108 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 1-20.) The record establishes
that the district court fully and completely complied with the mandates of Rule 11.
Ball does not contend that the district court failed to follow the
requirements of Rule 11. He instead argues that the court "abused its discretion
by refusing to be bound by the Rule 11 plea agreement at sentencing" because
"the opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea was not a sufficient remedy" and
because Rule 11 prohibited the district court from considering any information
other than the PSI before accepting or rejecting the strictures of the sentencing
recommendation in the plea agreement. (Appellant's brief, p. 4.) Ball's argument
is without merit.
On appeal, Ball cites only three legal authorities, Schoaer v. State, l d a h o , 226 P.3d 1269 (2010); State v. Hedaer, 115 ldaho 598, 600-601, 768
P.2d 1331, 1333-34 (1989); and I.C.R. 11. (Appellant's brief, pp. 4-7.) None of
these authorities, however, in any way supports Ball's argument.
In Schoqer the district court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting a
proffered guilty plea. Schoaer,

ldaho at -,

226 P.3d at 1275-76. The only

issue addressed and decided in Schoaer was a district court's discretion to reject

a proffered guilty plea. This case in no way addressed the question of when a
court would be bound to follow a sentencing recommendation.
In Hedger the ldaho Supreme Court addressed a claim of error related to
a challenge for cause to a potential juror. Hedger, 7 15 ldaho at 600, 768 P.2d at
1333. This case is not relevant to the argument Ball asserts.

Finally, Rule 11 does not provide a "remedy," and Ball does not state why
he believes it does; nor does he state what wrong the rule is supposed to provide
a remedy for.

Rather, the rule is very clear:

under certain types of plea

agreements the court must either accept the parties' sentencing recommendation
or it must allow the defendant to withdraw his plea. That Ball wishes there was a
third option -- that the court was completely bound to accept the recommendation

-- does not alter the rule; the plain language of the rule does not bend to his
desires.

The district court clearly did what the rule requires.

Once it had

concluded that it would not give a sentence within the limits set in the plea
agreement, it gave Ball the opportunity to withdraw his plea.'
Ball's argument that Rule 11 prohibited the district court from considering
the PSE or polygraph before deciding whether to accept the parties' sentencing
recommendations is also without merit. The PSI is mentioned in the ort ti on of

' Ball's underlying premise - that if he withdrew his plea he would be vulnerable
to prosecution for matters revealed in the PSE or polygraph - is also highly
questionable. The most likely reading of the agreement is that it effectively
granted limited immunity for statements Ball made during the psychosexuai and
polygraph examinations such that the state was barred from using the
information he disclosed in any criminal prosecution other than the sentencing in
this case. (4114108 Tr., p. 5, L. 19 - p. 6, L. 3.) Thus, the state's obligation to not
prosecute would be triggered by the full and voluntary participation in the
evaluations, not the ultimate acceptance of the sentencing recommendations.

the rule providing that the sentencing court may defer acceptance of the
agreement. I.C.R. II(f)(Z) (the court may "defer its decision as to acceptance or
rejection until there has been an opportunity to consider the presentence report").
The relevant language applicable here, however, is in a different subsection of
the rule. "If the court rejects the plea agreement, the court shall, on the record,
inform the parties of this fact, advise the defendant personally in open court ...
that the court is not bound by the plea agreement [and] afford the defendant the
opportunity to then withdraw the defendant's plea ...." I

. Il ( ( 4 ) . Under the

plain language of the rule the court could initially accept the plea agreement, but
then, after considering everything at sentencing, conclude that the agreed-upon
sentence is not appropriate, reject the agreement, and give the defendant the
opportunity to withdraw his plea. There is nothing in the language of the rule
supporting Ball's argument that the district court is restricted to deciding the
sentence on the PSI alone.
The district court followed Rule 11 when it gave Ball the opportunity to
withdraw his guilty plea after it had decided that it would not be bound by the
parties' sentencing recommendation. This is all that Rule 11 requires. Ruling
that a district court is bound to give a sentence it deems inappropriate would do
violence both to the language of the rule and the public policy underlying it. Ball
has failed to show error by the district court.

II.
Ball Has Failed To Show That His Sentence Is Excessive
A.

Introduction
The judge imposed a sentence of 20 years with seven years fixed upon

Ball's conviction for rape. (7/10/08 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 15-17; R., vol. II, pp. 263-67.)
Ball contends the court abused its discretion because he claimed acceptance of
responsibility and had the support of his family.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9.)

While acceptance of responsibility is laudable, especially if sincere, and the
support of family is certainly worthy of consideration, Ball has failed to show that,
when all of the facts are considered, the district court's sentence is
unreasonable.
B.

Standard Of Review
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review

only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 ldaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d
397, 401 (2007).

The appellant has the burden of demonstrating that the

sentencing court abused its discretion.

C.

Ball Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Sentencinq Discretion
To bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of discretion, the appellant

must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the sentence is
excessive. State v. Farwell, 144 ldaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 397, 401 (2007). To
establish that his sentence is excessive, Ball must demonstrate that reasonable
minds could not conclude the sentence is appropriate to accomplish the
sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution.

Farwell, 144 ldaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. In determining whether the appellant
met his burden, the court considers the entire sentence but, because the
decision to release him on parole is exclusively the province of the executive
branch, presumes that the determinate portion will be the period of actual
incarceration. State v. Oliver, 144 ldaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007).
The district court stated that the facts of the crime, unmentioned in Ball's
argument (B

generally Appellant's brief, pp. 7-Q), were "a big factor in the

sentence" it ultimately ordered (7/10/08 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 1-2). The court stated
those facts as follows:
We have a situation where we have a defendant in his 40's - he's
age 43 right now - who had an ongoing sexual relationship with the
victim, who was sixteen years old. This was not an isolated event.
It was an ongoing situation. And of greatest concern, however, is
that, based on what I have seen in the material that's been supplied
to me, is that it was not a consensual relationship. It was
perpetrated by the defendant through threats to the victim, in effect
blackmailing the victim through threats to - to her to perpetuate the
ongoing relationship.
(7/10/08 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 2-13.) This abuse, the court concluded, had a great effect
on the victim and her family, which would probably last the rest of her life.
(7/10/08 Tr., p. 32, Ls. 14-23.) The court also noted that in his statement Ball
neglected to mention the effect his conduct had had on the victim and her family.
(7/10/08 Tr., p. 33, Ls. 7-12.)
Contrary to Ball's arguments, the court specifically considered Ball's family
support. (7/10/08 Tr., p. 32, L. 24 - p. 33, L. 7.) This was, the court concluded, a
somewhat mixed positive, however, because Ball had, through his actions, also
greatly harmed his family. (Id.)

The district court also, contrary to Ball's argument, specifically considered
Ball's statements of remorse.

(7/10/08 Tr., p. 33, Ls. 13-19.)

The court

specifically stated that based at least in part on Ball's willingness to accept
responsibility he had the ability to be rehabilitated. (7/10/08 Tr., p. 33, L. 13 - p.

34, L. 8.)

The court felt that Ball's rehabilitation potential was outweighed,

however, by the facts of the crime when it considered all the goals of sentencing.
(7/10/08 Tr., p. 34, Ls. 8-14.)
The district court specifically considered the factors Ball relies on in his
appellate argument. The court found those factors to be outweighed by other
factors, especially the facts of the crime itself. Ball merely ignores the other
factors found significant by the district court. Because Ball has failed to show
that the district court abused its discretion in balancing the applicable factors
under the proper legal standard, he has failed to show an abuse of discretion.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Ball's judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 4th day of May 2010.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 4th day of May 2010, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
addressed to:
HEATHER M. CARLSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

